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Note 
In Re Seagate: One Step Closer to a Rational Doctrine 
Justin McCarthy∗ 
Seagate Technology defended itself in a patent suit against 
charges that it willfully violated the plaintiff’s patent by raising 
an opinion of counsel defense.1  As a result, the trial court 
issued a discovery order that permitted discovery of 
communications and work-product that applied not only to the 
outside counsel that issued the opinion but also to trial 
counsel.2  Seagate sought and was granted a writ of mandamus 
from the Federal Circuit to prohibit enforcement of the order.3  
In granting the writ, an en-banc Federal Circuit in Seagate 
overturned the standard of care required for potential patent 
infringers to avoid punitive damages first announced in 
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.4  At the same 
time, the Federal Circuit limited the ability of opposing counsel 
to obtain privileged attorney-client communications with an 
accused infringer’s trial counsel through discovery due to an 
advice of counsel defense asserted in response to a charge of 
willful infringement.5 
                                                          
© 2009 Justin McCarthy. 
∗ Justin McCarthy is a candidate for J.D. at the University of Minnesota. 
Justin wishes to thank his wife Jessa and daughter Grace for all their love and 
support. Thank you also to all the staff and editors of MJLST,  volume 
10 for their great work. 
 1. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc). 
 2. Id. at 1366–67. 
 3. Id. at 1376. 
 4. Id. at 1365 (citing Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 
717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 5. See id. at 1365, 1374–75. An advice of counsel defense, or a patent 
opinion, allows a company to defend against charges of willful infringement by 
submitting the patent at issue and the accused product at issue to a 
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Seagate raises a number of important issues pertinent to 
patent litigation.  While the Federal Circuit changed the 
standard for willful infringement, it declined to decide which 
factors would be used in determining willful infringement.6  
The consequences of this ruling are great, as a recent study 
found that 92.3 percent of all patent infringement lawsuits 
include allegations of willfulness.7  Furthermore, damages for 
such findings can be in the tens of millions of dollars.8  
Knowing what evidence a court is likely to consider important 
in determining whether the infringement was willful will be 
important both to plaintiffs, when they decide whether to 
pursue willfulness charges, and to defendants when they are 
preparing their defense.  Additionally, knowing more about the 
legal landscape of willfulness will help companies structure 
their conduct to avoid the dreaded and costly “willful infringer” 
finding.  Finally, the Seagate ruling will have consequences on 
pre-trial strategy9 and discovery.10 
                                                          
supposedly independent patent attorney for a written opinion as to whether or 
not the accused device infringes and whether or not the patent at issue is 
valid. Patent opinions may also be used before there is a problem as a legal 
opinion that a particular device or system does not infringe any other patent. 
See David V. Radack, Understanding Patent Infringement Legal Opinions, 
JOM, November 1995 at 54 available at 
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-9512.html (last 
visited 12/12/2008). 
 6. Id. at 1371 (“We leave it to future cases to further develop the 
application of this standard.”). 
 7. Matthew Leary, Adverse To What?: The Increasing Value of Patent 
Opinions After Knorr-Bremse, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 273 (2007) 
(citing a study by Federal Circuit Judge Kimberly A. Moore). 
 8. See id. at 274 (discussing a 1991 verdict of $53 million for 3M for 
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedic, Inc.’s willful infringement and a 2001 award 
of $85 million in enhanced damages to Boston Scientific for Medtronic’s willful 
infringement). 
 9. Cf. Felicia J. Boyd et al., Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., In Seagate 
Decision, Federal Circuit Raises Standard for Willfulness in Patent 
Infringement Suits (2007), 
http://www.faegre.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=2819 (discussing briefly the 
potential effects of the Seagate decision on litigation strategy). 
 10. Id.: 
With respect to the scope of waiver, In re Seagate makes a clear 
distinction between “opinion counsel” and “trial counsel.”  
Additionally, it continues to afford trial courts the discretion to 
expand the waiver of privilege to trial counsel, for example, in 
situations where the parties or counsel engage in “chicanery.”  This 
analysis assumes that “trial counsel” and “opinion counsel” can be 
readily distinguished and leaves unclear the types of conduct that 
would constitute chicanery.  Thus, it may be wise to continue the 
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This Comment both provides a critique of the Seagate 
decision and offers some guidance on the types of factors that a 
court will likely consider when determining willful 
infringement.  This Comment first details the relevant patent 
and other intellectual property law that predated the Seagate 
decision.  Next, this Comment summarizes Seagate in more 
detail, describes the potential weaknesses in the Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning, and provides some insight as to which 
factors the court will likely use in determining the willfulness 
of patent infringement.  To do this, this Comment relies on 
other areas of intellectual property law and the conceptions of 
willfulness found in those areas.  Finally, this Comment 
concludes that while the Federal Circuit left the factors that 
will be important in this new regime open for later cases, some 
hints can be divined from Seagate itself and from related areas 
of law. 
I. BACKGROUND OF PATENTS GENERALLY AND OF 
“WILLFULNESS” IN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. PATENTS GENERALLY AND THE HISTORY OF WILLFUL 
INFRINGEMENT 
The Constitution authorizes Congress “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”11  To accomplish this 
task, Congress created the first U.S. patent statute in 1790, 
shortly after the passage of the Constitution.12  A patent 
confers upon an inventor the exclusive privilege to make, use, 
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention for a limited time.13  
This privilege has often been called a state-granted monopoly.14  
The purpose of granting a patent is to give incentives to 
                                                          
practice of keeping the identity and activities of trial counsel distinct 
and separate from that of opinion counsel. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Prior to the Constitution, individual states 
often created their own patent systems.  This was thought to be ineffective 
and, thus, provision for federal patent law was made one of the enumerated 
powers of Congress when the Constitution was adopted.  See Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964). 
 12. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERAL DUFFY, PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (4th ed. 2007) (citing the Patent Act of 
1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (Apr. 10, 1790)). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 14. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 229. 
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inventors who invent new and useful things and to encourage 
public disclosure of those inventions.15  Currently, patent 
protection is limited to twenty years from the effective date of 
filing.16 
In order to be granted a patent, an invention must meet 
certain criteria.17  The first requirement is that only 
“process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or composition[s] of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” qualify as 
patentable subject matter.18  Next, patent law requires that an 
invention be novel19 and possess some useful purpose.20 Patent 
law also rejects inventions that are obvious variations of 
existing inventions.21  Finally, the patent application must 
meet certain additional requirements, such as enabling a 
person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the 
invention, specifying the “best mode” of practicing the 
invention, and having proper claim term definiteness.22  A 
patent is issued if these requirements are satisfied.23 
A modern issued patent has many features, the most 
                                                          
 15. Id.; see Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). 
 16. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
 17. See id. § 101. 
 18. Id.  The presumption is that anything is patentable except laws of 
nature, abstract ideas, and physical phenomenon.  See Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 33 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse 56 U.S. 62, 
112–121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853)). Compare 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303 (holding that a man-made oil eating bacteria is 
patentable), with  O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 62–63 (holding that a claim to all 
methods of communicating at a distance using electricity is an abstract idea 
and not patentable). 
 19. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (describing the conditions for 
patentability, novelty, and loss of right to patent). 
 20. Id. § 101; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1966) 
(“Our starting point is the proposition, neither disputed nor disputable, that 
one may patent only that which is ‘useful.’”). 
 21. 35 U.S.C § 103(a) (2000): 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.  
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the 
invention was made. 
 22. See id. § 112. 
 23. Id. § 101. 
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important of which is the “claims” section.24  The claims section 
is “the portion of the patent document that defines the scope of 
the patentee’s rights . . . .”25  Note however, that “the claims 
must be supported by the disclosure in the rest of the patent 
specification.”26 
Congress has created a cause of action against violation, or 
“infringement,” of the exclusive rights granted to an inventor 
who holds a patent.27  An infringement occurs when someone 
“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention . . . .”28  The patent’s claims retain primary 
importance when determining whether infringement has 
occurred, although the claim specification also plays an 
important role in the “claim construction” portion of the trial.29  
Infringement is currently a strict liability offense, meaning 
intent to infringe or lack thereof has no legal significance.30  
Consequently, under the current state of the law, an 
independent inventor who has no knowledge of the existence of 
the patented invention (or of the patent for that matter) is still 
liable for infringement. 
If the accused infringer is found guilty of infringement by a 
court, she may be enjoined from further infringement31 and 
assessed “damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for 
the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”32 
Congress has also authorized the awarding of so-called 
                                                          
 24. Every patent must include at least one claim.  See id. § 112, ¶ 2. 
 25. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); 
“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as 
his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 212 (2000). 
 26. Merges & Duffy, supra note 12, at 26. 
 27. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil 
action for infringement of his patent.”). 
 28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 29. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 569–71 (1876); see also Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In patent 
litigation, if there is any dispute as to what the patent at issue means or 
covers, a “claim construction” or “Markman” hearing is held where the judge 
decides the issue as a matter of law; see generally Markman, 517 U.S. 370. 
 30. Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of 
the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 56–57 
(2001). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). 
 32. Id. § 284. 
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“triple damages” by discretion of the court.33  The statute 
makes no mention of what constitutes grounds for the 
awarding of increased damages.34  Traditionally courts have 
used the triple damages provision only where the infringer 
deliberately copied the patented technology.35  Recently, courts 
have expanded this provision to apply to cases “against 
infringers who independently developed their own technology, 
without appropriating ideas from the patentee.”36  
Understanding why courts first imposed the deliberate 
infringement standard and why they later expanded the reach 
of the applicable cases where triple damages are imposed (and 
what that expansion included) requires a brief look at the 
history and language of the patent laws.37 
The Patent Act of 1790 provided that the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary for the Department of War, and the 
Attorney General would evaluate patent applications to 
determine whether they were worthy of a patent.38  The act 
further specified that infringers were liable for monetary 
damages determined by a jury. 39  Congress modified the act in 
the Patent Act of 1793, making two important changes.  First, 
the patent duties held by the Secretary of State, Secretary for 
the Department of War, and Attorney General were reduced to 
ministerial duties.40  Patents were no longer reviewed to 
determine whether they were worthy of a patent; instead, 
patents were granted for any invention which met very lenient 
standards, effectively turning the patent system into a 
registration system.41  The second important change arose from 
                                                          
 33. Id. (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed.”). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 55. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See generally Powers & Carlson, supra note 30 for a more thorough 
look at the history of the Patent Act of 1793 and the evolution of the doctrine 
of willful patent infringement. 
 38. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (1790). 
 39. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. at 111. 
 40. Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 62. 
 41. See id; see generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 12, at 8–9: 
But while the patent system got on its feet under Jefferson, it did not 
grow to its full stature until the 1836 revision, when a formal system 
of examination, with professional examiners, was substituted for the 
pro forma registration system of the 1793 Act, a system which had 
itself been substituted for the original (1790) procedure under which 
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Congress’ fear that patent rights were not adequately respected 
throughout the country.  Congress feared jury nullification, 
whereby a jury that disliked patents could award nominal 
damages to patent holders whose patents had been infringed.42  
Probably as a result of this fear, the Patent Act of 1793 
contained a provision that mandated a jury award of triple the 
price of the patentee’s invention.43 
The Patent Act of 1836 changed the damages from 
mandatory triple damages to a maximum of triple damages 
based on the discretion of the court.44  Congress made this 
change to protect good-faith infringers who had legitimately 
discovered the patented invention independently and were 
being hurt by the triple damages provision.45  Congress was 
also likely worried about unscrupulous individuals taking 
advantage of the relative ease of obtaining a patent under the 
pro-forma registration system and obtaining patents on 
inventions they did not invent, and then obtaining large 
verdicts against real innovators.46  The judicial doctrine of 
awarding of triple damages only for situations in which the 
defendant deliberately infringed the patent sprang out of this 
reasoning.47  This doctrine remained the law until Underwater 
Devices expanded its application in 1983.48 
In Underwater Devices, Spencer Robley had patented a 
                                                          
patentability was determined by three high-level government officials 
(including Jefferson as Secretary of State). 
 42. At least one historian credits this fear to a pamphlet published by a 
patent agent named Joseph Barnes, in which he “criticized the ‘indeterminate 
principle upon which patents are granted,’ as well as the limitation of 
damages for infringement to those assessed by a jury.”  Powers & Carlson, 
supra note 30, at 61–62.  Barnes was the patent agent of an aggrieved 
inventor. Id. at 61. 
 43. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11 § 5, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (“[E]very person so 
offending, shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least 
equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or 
licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention . . . .”). 
 44. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836) (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000)). 
 45. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 67–68. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1853); Powers & 
Carlson supra note 30, at 69–70 (“Courts justified imposing treble damages as 
a means to punish the misappropriation of patented technology. Courts also 
used the treble damages provision as a way to punish bad faith business 
tactics in the context of patent licensing agreements.”). 
 48. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 
1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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method for laying pipe underwater.49  When Morrison-Knudsen 
Co. was bidding to build an underwater sewer in Hawaii, the 
owner of Robley’s patent contacted Morrison-Knudsen with an 
offer to license the patent for the project.50  Morrison-Knudsen 
commenced operations on its independently derived (yet 
infringing) method after receiving only an initial cursory 
opinion of  the invalidity of the Robley patent from its general 
counsel.51  Morrison-Knudsen later obtained a more thorough 
opinion regarding the patent after it had already begun laying 
pipe.52  Building on prior cases,53 the court held that once “a 
potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, 
he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine 
whether or not he is infringing.”54  This standard applies 
regardless of whether the accused infringer intended to 
infringe.55  The court rejected Morrison-Knudsen’s defense of 
good-faith reliance on counsel because the opinion was biased, 
for it was given by in-house counsel and was only a cursory 
examination.56 
Under the Federal Circuit jurisprudence following the 
Underwater Devices standard, 
[T]he general test for whether a patentee is entitled to increased 
damages is whether, in view of the totality of the circumstances, the 
patentee shows by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer 
acted in disregard of the patent and lacked a reasonable basis for 
believing it had a right to do so.57 
A court could consider several factors in determining 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 1382. 
 50. Id. at 1384. 
 51. Id. at 1385. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1389–90 (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 
623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc, 415 F.2d 
1068 (6th Cir. 1969); Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 386 F.2d 
287 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
 54. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389. 
 55. See id. at 1390. 
 56. Id. at 1390. 
 57. Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 82; see also Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. 
Fata Aluminium, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002): 
[T]he focus is generally on whether the infringer exercised due care to 
avoid infringement, usually by seeking the advice of competent and 
objective counsel, and receiving exculpatory advice.  When it is found 
that the infringer acted without a reasonable belief that its actions 
would avoid infringement, the patentee has established willful 
infringement, which may be accompanied by enhanced damages. 
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whether conduct was willful and the plaintiff was entitled to 
triple damages: 
(1) Whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of 
another; 
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent 
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-
faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; 
(3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation. 
 . . . . 
(4) Defendant’s size and financial condition. 
(5) Closeness of the case. 
(6) Duration of the defendant’s misconduct. 
(7) Remedial action by the defendant. 
(8) Defendant’s motivation for harm. 
(9) Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.58 
In the absence of evidence of actual, deliberate copying, the 
court permits evidence in its consideration of factors two 
through nine that would allow the court to infer that 
willfulness occurred (essentially relying on circumstantial 
evidence), either in infringing initially or infringing after the 
party was notified that its process or product potentially 
infringed. 
The problem with the second factor is that a defendant 
must have a “good-faith” belief, so this factor often “turn[s] on 
the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the infringement.”59  
State of mind is entirely subjective, and a defendant must 
somehow prove his state of mind.60  An opinion of counsel that 
is adequate and relied upon can be evidence of that state of 
mind.61  Thus one common way for a firm to avoid liability is to 
utilize factor number two and obtain a competent written 
opinion by counsel upon receiving notice that a product or 
device potentially infringes.62  Courts evaluating this defense 
would look into the adequacy of the opinion, considering such 
factors as the “nature of the advice, the thoroughness and 
                                                          
 58. Read Corp.,  970 F.2d at 827 (citations omitted). 
 59. Joshua Stowell, Comment, Willful Infringement and the Evidentiary 
Value of Opinion Letters After Knorr-Bremse v. Dana, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 5, ¶ 29, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0005.pdf. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Douglas Y’Barbo, Written Opinions from Counsel, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 
65, 70–71 (2001). 
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competence of the legal opinion presented, and its objectivity. 
The court will determine whether the advice of non-
infringement or invalidity or unenforceability could have 
reasonably been relied on . . . .”63 
One problem with utilizing this approach is that a court 
scrutinizes the opinion to determine whether the defendant 
should have reasonably relied upon the advice given.64  
Frequently this entails detailed and much criticized forays into 
minutia of patent opinions of which non-lawyers would likely 
not be aware.65  This creates problems for infringement 
defendants and sets up a series of catch-22 situations.  If the 
company obtains two opinions, it might be deemed to be 
engaged in opinion shopping.66  If the opinion is too short, it is 
arguably incompetent; if it is too long, the court may suspect 
that it is designed to avoid willfulness findings.67 
In later decisions, the Federal Circuit adopted an “adverse 
                                                          
 63. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). 
 64. Y’Barbo, supra note 62, at 67.  The author writes: 
[S]hould the lawyer’s written opinion turn out to be anything less 
than an exhaustive recitation on every issue of even the remotest 
relevance, the opinion may no longer serve as a defense to willful 
infringement.  For example, if counsel omits a doctrine of equivalents 
analysis, omits an objective factors analysis, fails to base a validity 
analysis on un-cited prior art, omits any other of patent law’s hyper-
technical minutiae that relates to infringement, validity, or 
enforceability, regardless of whether it influences the opinion’s 
conclusion, the firm pays for those failure of omissions in a potentially 
big way.  In addition, the purely technical quality of a legal document 
is somehow supposed to be probative of the reader’s state of mind. 
This is a strange end result considering that the reader is almost 
always unqualified to assess the technical merit of such a document.  
Yet that is exactly what the law requires from a law firm in order to 
insulate itself against a charge of willful infringement: it must 
critically evaluate its lawyer’s advice rather than point to a good faith 
basis for having relied upon it. 
Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. I.e., the defendant may be getting multiple opinions for the purpose of 
finding one that is more favorable to its position.  Id. at 99–100. 
 67. See id. at 101: 
One might also imagine a dispute over the thoroughness of an 
opinion.  The infringer urges that because his opinion considered 
every remotely plausible issue, there is clear evidence of his intent to 
avoid infringement.  On the other hand, the plaintiff argues that the 
one hundred-page opinion was in fact strategically designed to avoid 
enhanced damages, rather than provide the infringer with 
straightforward information about whether it can sell its product. 
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inference” against infringers who, knowing that they were 
potentially infringing a patent, failed to seek an opinion from 
outside counsel.68 
B. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ISSUE IN WILLFULNESS 
INFRINGEMENT 
The attorney-client privilege protects communications 
between an attorney and his client from disclosure and possible 
use against the client during a trial or other proceeding.69  The 
“privilege ‘is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and 
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having 
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which 
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free 
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.’”70  
This privilege can be waived by the client.71 
Several court decisions have held that when an accused 
patent infringer relies on the advice of counsel defense, such a 
defense constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.72 
This waiver extends to all communications relating to the 
subject matter of the opinion.73  Some cases have extended this 
waiver to communications between trial counsel and the 
accused infringer, finding the communications between the two 
all bear on the mental state of the infringer (i.e., whether the 
alleged infringer reasonably relied upon the opinion), which is 
                                                          
 68. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 79–82; Fromson v. W. Litho 
Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568,  1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  This negative 
inference was overruled prior to Seagate in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no longer 
provide an adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an opinion 
would have been unfavorable.”).  Despite this ruling, many commentators 
noted that the real effect of this ruling was minimal at best.”).  See, e.g., Debra 
Koker, Fulfilling the “Due Care” Requirement after Knorr-Bremse, 11 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 154, 162 (2005).  See infra note 77 for a more thorough 
discussion. 
 69. See Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 70. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888)). 
 71. U.S. v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Any disclosure 
inconsistent with maintaining the confidential nature of the attorney-client 
relationship waives the attorney-client privilege. Any voluntary disclosure by 
the client to a third party waives the privilege not only as to the specific 
communication disclosed, but often as to all other communications relating to 
the same subject matter.”). 
 72. See In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 73. Id. 
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relevant in determining whether the infringement is willful.74  
This was the ruling of the district court that was eventually 
overturned in Seagate.75 
Commentators have often criticized this waiver theory on 
the grounds that allowing the jury to hear potentially 
damaging statements regarding an accused infringer’s 
assessment of the situation could potentially prejudice the 
jury’s determination of actual infringement.76 
Thus, infringement defendants often were forced to choose 
between disclosure of potentially prejudicial information or 
withhold the information and risk exposure to triple damages.77 
C. THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT RULE AND WILLFULNESS 
INFRINGEMENT 
The Supreme Court, in the watershed case of Hickman v. 
Taylor, held that production of “written statements and mental 
impressions contained in the files and the mind of the 
attorney”78 are protected from discovery unless the party 
seeking production shows substantial need and/or hardship. 79 
                                                          
 74. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 92 & n.287 (stating the 
position and providing several district court opinions extending the scope to 
trial counsel). 
 75. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 76. See, e.g., Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 91–92. 
 77. M. Curt Lambert, Note, Knorr-Bremse’s Elimination of Adverse 
Inferences: A First Step in Willful Infringement Litigation Reform, 32 N. KY. L. 
REV. 589, 605 (2005) (noting the burdens facing litigants under the “adverse 
inference” rule). Note that while Knorr-Bremse did remove the adverse 
inference rule from consideration, it retained the duty of care. Many 
commentators argued that this did not remove the difficult choice a patent 
litigant was faced with since the only way to show due care was to produce a 
patent opinion.  Id. at 609–10 (“Thus, while the trier of fact can no longer infer 
that legal advice would have been unfavorable when the infringer failed to 
obtain it, the trier of fact can still consider this failure when deciding if a good 
faith belief of  invalidity or non-infringement was formed.”); see also Koker, 
supra note 68, at 162: 
Arguably, telling a jury that an infringer did not bother to obtain a 
patent opinion when he could and should have is very similar to an 
adverse inference.  Likewise, telling a jury that an infringer obtained 
a patent opinion and is choosing not to disclose it will likely create an 
adverse inference in their minds. 
 Leary, supra note 7, at 294 (“Even for cases decided after Knorr-Bremse, 
district courts have been almost unanimous in allowing evidence of 
defendants’ failures to obtain opinions.”). 
 78. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947). 
 79. See id. at 511; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“[A] party may obtain 
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In the willful infringement context, courts are split over 
whether the advice of counsel defense allows the opposing party 
to obtain discovery of the opinion counsel’s attorney work-
product.80  The theory for allowing it is that it is relevant for 
purposes of attacking the opposing party’s reasonableness for 
relying upon the defense.81  However, this presents the same 
tough choices for patent infringement defendants that the 
aforementioned attorney-client privilege waivers present. 
D. AN EXAMINATION OF WILLFULNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
An examination of copyright law is relevant as a point of 
comparison as copyright law also contains a provision for 
increased damages for willful violations,82 and the Seagate 
court relied heavily on this definition of “willful.”83  Copyright 
cases have a threshold requirement, similar to patent cases,84 
to show willfulness once the defendant has been put on notice 
of his or her potentially infringing conduct: “Proof that a 
warning of infringement was received and disregarded is 
essential to show willful infringement.”85  Copyright cases hold 
that the standard for judging willfulness is recklessness.86  
                                                          
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative . . . 
only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of 
the materials in the preparation of the party’s case and that the party is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means.”). 
 80. Eco Mfg. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2003 WL 1888988, at *4 (S.D. Ind. 
2003) (recognizing a division among courts); see also In re Seagate,  497 F.3d 
1360, 1372 (“In considering the scope of waiver resulting from the advice of 
counsel defense, district courts have reached varying  results with respect to 
trial counsel.”). 
 81. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369. 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (“In a case where the copyright owner 
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was 
committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.”). 
 83. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370. 
 84. See Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389 (stating that in patent 
infringement cases, a potential infringer’s actual notice of another’s patent 
rights creates “an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether 
or not he is infringing”). 
 85. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright § 262 (2008) (citing Doehrer v. Caldwell, 
1980 WL 1158, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1980), disapproved of on other grounds, F.E.L. 
Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 754 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
 86. Willfulness in this context means that the defendant “recklessly 
disregarded” the possibility that “its conduct represented infringement.” 
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These cases have often found the following factors helpful in 
determining whether a copyright violation is willful. 
(1) “lack of intent to infringe;”87 
(2) “a bona fide belief in noninfringement;”88 
(3) “a substantial defense to the infringement charge;”89 
(4) “failure of the defendant to seek advice of counsel.”90 
Where infringement is found, a court may consider the 
following factors when evaluating an award of statutory 
damages: 
(5) “defendant’s mitigating conduct towards the copyright 
holder;”91 
(6) “the extent of the infringing defendant’s contributions 
to the project;”92 
(7) “the fact that the project caused the infringer to lose 
considerable sums of money.”93 
E. SUMMARY 
When Underwater Devices was decided, it was a difficult 
period for patents and the enforcement of patents.94  The 
somewhat less rigorous “due care” standard was most likely 
intended by the Federal Circuit as a deterrent for would-be 
patent infringers.  This deterrent was likely necessary to 
ensure the continued vitality of the patent system for 
                                                          
Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Fitzgerald Publ’g 
Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also 
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1010 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[R]eckless 
disregard of the copyright holder’s rights . . .  suffices to warrant award of the 
enhanced damages.”).  A plaintiff  is not required to show that the defendant 
“‘had knowledge that its actions constitute[d] an infringement.’” Id. at 1010; 
Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 87. 18 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 85. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Lewis R. Clayton, ‘Seagate’s’ Objective Standard—’State of Mind’ 
Irrelevant, 238 N.Y.L.J. 3, Sept. 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.paulweiss.com/resources/pubs/detail.aspx?publication=1634 
(“Underwater Devices was issued at a time when, the Federal Circuit later 
said, ‘widespread disregard of patent rights was undermining the national 
innovation incentive.’”) (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge 
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
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protecting and fostering innovation.  However, times have 
changed, and the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is also 
changing.  For the first several years after the Federal Circuit 
was created, the Supreme Court took few appeals, perhaps 
because they felt the Federal Circuit was correctly interpreting 
the law.95  Recently, the Supreme Court has taken more 
appeals from the Federal Circuit and has reversed it several 
times.96  Some speculate that perhaps the Court is unsettled 
regarding the pro-patent Federal Circuit.97  The Federal Circuit 
has responded by backing away slightly.  As a result of 
widespread disapproval98 of the due care standard of 
willfulness, the standard walked right into the crosshairs of a 
Federal Circuit that is attempting to moderate its pro-patent 
position. 
II. SEAGATE FIXES SOME ISSUES AND LEAVES SOME 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
Faced with a patent litigation suit where the plaintiff was 
charging willful infringement, Seagate Corporation utilized the 
“opinion of counsel” defense in an attempt to show that its 
infringement was based on a good faith belief that the patent at 
issue was invalid.99  This tactic then raised the issue of waiver 
of the defendant’s attorney-client privileges and attorney work-
product.100  Seagate voluntarily disclosed the opinion counsel’s 
entire work-product and made the opinion counsel himself 
available for a deposition.101  Plaintiff Convolve, Inc. sought to 
compel, and the district court granted, discovery of much more, 
including “any communications and work-product of Seagate’s 
other counsel, including its trial counsel.”102  The district court 
defined the scope of the waiver to extend to any communication 
concerning the opinion for the time period between when 
                                                          
 95. Tony Mauro, High Court Case Could Imperil Pending Patents, LEGAL 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1164636899425 (noting that, until 
recently, the Federal Circuit’s decisions were usually affirmed). 
 96. Id. (stating that, in the past four years, the Supreme Court has taken 
nine Federal Circuit appeals and affirmed none). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent 
Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003). 
 99. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 100. Id. at 1369–70. 
 101. Id. at 1366. 
 102. Id. at 1366. 
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Seagate first gained knowledge of the patents until the 
infringement ceased. 103  Seagate, faced with potentially very 
damaging disclosures of confidential communications, 
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, which 
the court granted.104 
The court’s first item of business was to review the 
standard announced in Underwater Devices that defined willful 
infringement.105  The court’s reasoning for examining this issue 
was that a change in the standard of willfulness might change 
the relevancy of any documents sought by the plaintiff.106  The 
court here indicated the need to review the willfulness 
standard given the subtle interplay between willfulness, due 
care, and the waiver rules.107  If the standard for willful 
infringement were changed from a subjective standard to an 
objective standard, the plaintiffs might not need to seek 
privileged documents to make their case, as it would no longer 
need evidence of the defendant’s state of mind. 
The court did change the standard, and in the process 
overruled Underwater Devices and the standard of “due care” 
for determination of willful infringement.108  In place of “due 
care”, the court stated that the true test is one of “objective 
recklessness”: “Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a 
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”109  
Furthermore, the court said that this objectively defined risk 
must have been “known or so obvious that it should have been 
known to the accused infringer.”110  Thus Seagate established a 
                                                          
 103. Id. at 1367. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1368–69. 
 106. Id. at 1371–72. (“While it is true that the issue of willful infringement, 
or even infringement for that matter, has not been decided by the trial court, it 
is indisputable that the proper legal standard for willful infringement informs 
the relevance of evidence relating to that issue and, more importantly here, 
the proper scope of discovery.”). 
 107. See id. at 1367 (reciting the questions for determination and listing as 
No. 3: “Given the impact of the statutory duty of care standard announced in 
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., on the issue of waiver of 
attorney-client privilege, should this court reconsider the decision in 
Underwater Devices and the duty of care standard itself?”) (citation omitted). 
 108. Id. at 1371. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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two-part test for finding willfulness. 
The essential reasoning of the court was that precedent 
has treated willfulness as the linchpin of a finding of treble 
damages, and the definition of the word “willful” as applied to 
patent law was different than the definition of “willful” as 
applied to other areas of law.111 Therefore, patent law should be 
“harmonized” with other areas of the law. The court cited Ebay, 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,112 for the proposition that the 
Supreme Court approves of harmonizing copyright and patent 
law.113  The court briefly reviewed copyright case law that uses 
“reckless” as the standard for its definition of “willful.”114  The 
Federal Circuit also analogized to other areas of the law to 
support its conclusion that willful equals reckless.  Specifically, 
the Federal Circuit used a Supreme Court decision that 
addressed the “meaning of willfulness as a statutory condition 
of civil liability for punitive damages” under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act.115  The Fair Credit Reporting Act had provisions 
for assessment of increased damages based on a finding of 
willfulness.116  In that case willfulness was defined as “reckless 
disregard of the law.” 117  The court concluded that because 
other areas of the law define willfulness as recklessness, patent 
law should as well.118  The court left further development of the 
standard open for later cases.119 
With the affirmative duty of care standard in flames, the 
court transitioned to the attorney-client privilege issue by 
stressing that there is “no affirmative obligation to obtain 
opinion of counsel,”120 and that the “state of mind of the 
accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.”121  
This set the stage for the discussion of the attorney-client 
                                                          
 111. See id. at 1370–71. 
 112. Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 113. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370. 
 114. Id. (“Under the Copyright Act, a copyright owner can elect to receive 
statutory damages, and trial courts have discretion to enhance the damages, 
up to a statutory maximum, for willful infringement.  Although the statute 
does not define willful, it has consistently been defined as including reckless 
behavior.”) (citation omitted). 
 115. Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S.Ct. 2201 (2007)). 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006). 
 117. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1371. 
 121. Id. 
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privilege and attorney work-product immunity.  Previously, 
courts often invoked the relevancy of the state of mind of the 
accused when granting broad discovery access to privileged 
attorney-client communications and work-product.122 
The court began by upholding the implied waiver rule, 
reasoning that opinion counsel communications are relevant to 
determining whether the objectively reckless risk was “known 
or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused 
infringer” and represents the objective business decision 
regarding whether or not infringement has occurred.123  This is 
also based on the premise of fairness: if the defense is going to 
use the advice of counsel defense, the other side must have 
access to be able to test that defense.124 
The court next addressed the trial counsel waiver by 
holding that “the significantly different functions of trial 
counsel and opinion counsel advise against extending waiver to 
trial counsel.”125  The court contrasted the role of opinion 
counsel with that of trial counsel, which has a significantly 
different function and role: to prepare for adversarial 
litigation.126  The need for access to the communications 
between trial counsel and client is strongly counterbalanced by 
the principles underlying the attorney-client and the attorney 
work-product privileges.127 
Furthermore, since the court found that most often trial 
counsel are retained after filing suit, any probative value would 
only be to post-filing conduct by the defendant.128  However, the 
court further reasoned that since litigation had already begun, 
                                                          
 122. See In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 123. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 124. Id. at 1372 (referring to the “sword and shield” theory of waiver 
whereby the subject matter scope of the waiver “is grounded in principles of 
fairness and serves to prevent a party from simultaneously using the privilege 
as both a sword and a shield; that is, it prevents the inequitable result of a 
party disclosing favorable communications while asserting the privilege as to 
less favorable ones”). 
 125. Id. at 1373. 
 126. Id. 
 127. The court discusses Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), which is 
really an attorney work-product case, and concludes that the same factors 
supporting the application of the attorney work-product doctrine apply to the 
attorney client privilege. Those factors are reduction of inefficiency, 
unfairness, and sharp practices.  Id. at 511. 
 128. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d at 1374. 
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the patentee could apply for a preliminary injunction to prevent 
ongoing infringement.129  If the preliminary injunction was 
granted, the patentee’s rights were protected from future 
infringement and there was no relevance to having trial 
counsel’s privileged communications or work-product.130  
Moreover, if the preliminary injunction was denied, it was 
likely because the plaintiff could not meet its burden of 
showing a substantial likelihood of success at trial, probably 
because the defendant had shown a substantial question as to 
invalidity.131  The court reasoned that the plaintiff was unlikely 
to be able to meet the new, more stringent, objective 
reasonableness standard in such a case (again making trial 
counsel communications and work-product useless).132  The 
court strongly hinted that in a case where a patentee sues an 
alleged infringer and pleads willful infringement but does not 
move for a preliminary injunction, the patentee “should not be 
allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely on the 
infringer’s post-filing conduct.”133  Implicit in this reasoning is 
that a patent holder should not be able to sleep on his or her 
rights (to obtain a preliminary injunction) and then drag a 
defendant to court for what could be a very long and drawn-out 
trial while the meter is running on the damages.134  The court 
left open for future consideration a case in which the 
preliminary injunction is denied on grounds other than the 
likelihood of success on the merits.135 
The majority opinion continued by holding that the advice 
of counsel waiver does not extend to the work-product of trial 
counsel.136  The court found the same rationales for the 
existence of the attorney work-product that the Supreme Court 
articulated in Hickman apply with equal force to patent 
cases.137 The court did not alter the standard rule that “a party 
may obtain discovery of work product [by showing] need and 
                                                          
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. In infringement cases, invalidity is one of the relevant factors a 
court uses to determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction.  See 
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 132. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d at 1374. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 1374. 
 136. Id. at 1375. 
 137. Id. at 1376. 
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Finally, the court granted Seagate’s mandamus and 
ordered the district court to “reconsider its discovery orders.”139  
This completely overhauled not only the willfulness standard, 
but also the scope of the attorney work-product and attorney-
client privilege doctrine. 
III. CRITICISM AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF 
WILFULLNESS LITIGATION 
A. THE USE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS A COROLLARY IN 
WILLFULNESS INFRINGEMENT. 
The majority opinion borrows case law regarding copyright 
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).140  Copyright opinions 
define the term “willfully” as used in the statute to mean 
“reckless” behavior.141  Thus the Seagate majority “harmonized” 
willfulness between patent law and copyright law.  The 
majority further supported this use of copyright law with a 
citation to Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,142 in which the 
Supreme Court majority opinion “not[ed] with approval that its 
resolution of the permanent injunction standard in the patent 
context created harmony with copyright law.”143  In contrast to 
copyright law, the patent statutes on damages do not mention 
the word “willfully” at all.  Judge Gajarsa’s Seagate 
concurrence, joined by Judge Newman, asserted that the court 
should not read “willfully” into the statute at all. Thus a 
comparison with copyright law, which specifically includes the 
term “willful” in the statute, is inappropriate.144  The 
                                                          
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. The statute provides that a copyright owner, in lieu of actual damages 
may recover an award of statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000.  17 
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).  It also provides that where the copyright owner proves that 
the infringement was “committed willfully,” the court can increase the award 
to a maximum of $150,000.  Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 141. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“Willfulness . . . means that the defendant ‘recklessly disregarded’ the 
possibility that ‘its conduct represented infringement.’”) (quoting Hamil 
America, Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 142. Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (cited in 
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370). 
 143. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370, quoting id. 
 144. Id at 1378–79 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
MCCARTHY.WEB 2/20/2009  12:08:53 PM 
2009] IN RE SEAGATE 375 
concurring opinion aimed to make the finding of “willfulness” a 
sufficient but not necessary element of awarding triple 
damages.145  The concurring justices would allow a judge 
control and wide discretion in awarding of punitive damages. 
The problem with the concurring opinion’s argument is 
that it uses a case, General Motors Corporation v. Devex 
Corporation,146 that refused to graft existing common law onto 
an after-arising statute regarding interest awarded for 
prevailing plaintiffs in patent infringement suits.147  Prior to 
1946, the Patent Act contained no specific interest provision for 
prevailing plaintiffs in patent litigation; nonetheless, the court 
applied a common law standard that when a party had acted in 
bad faith, the opposing party was entitled to interest.148  When 
the Patent Act was modified by Congress to specifically include 
interest in 1946, the awarding of interest was allocated to the 
discretion of the court.149  The General Motors court held that 
no bad faith standard should be read into the statute, thus 
giving the court broader discretion to award interest.150  The 
Seagate concurrence reasoned that “[w]hen Congress wishe[s] 
to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringement action, 
it [will say] so explicitly.”151  The problem with this opinion is 
that it ignores other Supreme Court precedent that explicitly 
integrates requirements not originally present in the statutes 
into the statutes themselves based on other similar statutes.  A 
good example is the watershed copyright case of Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., in which the Supreme 
Court upheld the legality of the video cassette recorder.152  In 
doing so, it imported the Patent Act’s staple article of commerce 
provision into copyright law.153  This provision exempts from 
the domain of contributory infringement any device that has a 
substantial non-infringing use.154  The Court found that the 
                                                          
 145. Id. 
 146. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) (refusing to 
incorporate the common law standard that in the absence of bad faith on the 
part of the defendant, interest did not accrue on unliquidated damages). 
 147. See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. at 1379–80. 
 149. Id. at 1380. 
 150. See Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 653–54. 
 151. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1380  (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 152. 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). 
 153. Id. at 442. 
 154. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the 
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VCR had a substantial non-infringing use as a device that 
facilitated “time shifting.”155 
Furthermore, any argument against harmonization ignores 
other cases that have interpreted patent and copyright law 
similarly. For example, copyright law has provisions for 
awarding attorney’s fees for prevailing parties at the discretion 
of the court.156  A split developed in the circuit courts over the 
standard a plaintiff must meet, as opposed to the standard a 
defendant must meet, to be entitled to an award of attorney’s 
fees if that party prevails at trial.157 One line of cases held that 
a defendant was allowed attorney’s fees if it could prove that 
the suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith, while the 
plaintiff was allowed attorney’s fees as a matter of course.158  
The other line of cases applied the same standard to both the 
plaintiff and defendant winners.159  The Supreme Court, in 
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,160 resolved this split by holding that 
the standard should be the same for plaintiffs and 
defendants.161  The court, in a footnote, compared its holding to 
the patent statute, which contained more specific language that 
was interpreted to be undifferentiated as to the party claiming 
the attorney’s fees.162 
These examples indicate that the Supreme Court will 
apply analogous rules when policy so requires.  The Court in 
Sony and Fogerty and the Federal Circuit in Seagate implicitly 
                                                          
United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented 
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus 
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the 
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for 
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of 
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a 
contributory infringer.”) (emphasis added). 
 155. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 
(1984). “Time shifting” is the process of recording a live television broadcast 
and watching it later. Id at 421. 
 156. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). (“In any civil action under this title, the court 
in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party 
other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise 
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to 
the prevailing party as part of the costs.”). 
 157. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 520–21 (1994). 
 158. See id. at 520–21. 
 159. See id. at 521. 
 160. Id. at 517. 
 161. Id. at 534. 
 162. Id. at 525 n.12. 
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recognized that at some points in time—particularly the 
remedy phase of an infringement action—the policies of the 
copyright and patent statutes are implicitly the same or very 
similar. The idea of both areas of law is to compensate the 
injured party and deter egregious conduct.  Thus, applying 
principles of patent law to copyright law and vice versa is not 
unjustifiable, even if the court were to add restrictions on 
statutory language that is not explicit in the statute. 
The Seagate concurrence provided examples to support its 
reasoning that the awarding of triple damages should not be 
confined to simply cases about willfulness.163  One of these 
examples involved a case where the patentee could not prove 
the amount of damages suffered at the hands of an infringer.164  
Thus in that case it would be difficult to adequately 
compensate the injured plaintiff and triple damages might be 
appropriate despite a lack of willfulness.  Indeed if the 
principles above regarding the merger of patent and copyright 
laws at the point of remedy are to be followed, one would point 
out that the copyright law has a statutory provision awarding 
statutory damages at the election of the copyright holder.165  
Thus one might argue that a reading of the Patent Act that 
would incorporate some element of discretion to the trial court 
beyond a finding of willfulness in awarding increased damages 
might be a necessary corollary.  In many ways the concerns the 
Seagate concurrence used to support the theory that increased 
damages can be awarded for circumstances outside of 
willfulness can be ameliorated without upsetting the holding of 
Seagate.  In those cases, one might read something into the 
patent law—namely that since copyright law recognizes other 
situations in which these increased damages might be 
appropriate, patent law might as well. 
                                                          
 163. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)  
(Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“I believe we should adhere to the plain meaning of 
the statute and leave the discretion to enhance damages in the capable hands 
of the district courts.”). 
 164. Id. at 1378 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“For example, assume that a 
substantial portion of a defendant’s sales data is inadvertently but 
irretrievably lost prior to discovery.”). 
 165. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time 
before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and 
profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the 
action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable 
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and 
severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $ 30,000 as the court 
considers just.”). 
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B. FUTURE DIRECTION AND RAMIFICATIONS 
1. What factors will be relevant to courts in assessing whether 
an infringement was willful? 
The Seagate court held that to establish willful 
infringement, “a patentee must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high 
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid 
patent.”166  The court stressed that “[t]he state of mind of the 
accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.”167  
The court chose not to provide additional guidance for finding 
willfulness168 but did suggest in a footnote that courts might 
apply “the standards of commerce.”169  The “standards of 
commerce” is not a term of art, so this clarification added little 
other than to perhaps point a court to look at commercial policy 
implications when determining which factors to consider. 
After Seagate, litigants can likely still present evidence of 
an intentional copying by the defendant to prove that the 
defendant “willfully” copied the patented invention.  But, in the 
absence of such evidence, the plaintiff will likely try to show 
that the defendant’s actions after learning of the plaintiff’s 
patent were objectively unreasonable.  Where the plaintiff does 
not possess direct evidence of willfulness, it may nevertheless 
present sufficient circumstantial evidence of willfulness to 
cause a court to infer willfulness when the rigorous “objectively 
unreasonable” standard is applied.  The question becomes: 
What factors should a court examine to determine whether the 
defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable?170 
One way a plaintiff will attack a defendant’s actions is to 
show that the defendant’s reading of the plaintiff’s patent was 
objectively unreasonable.  There are two related factors, 
already laid out by the Federal Circuit prior to Seagate, used to 
determine willful infringement that remain relevant: closeness 
of the case and defendant’s size and financial condition. 
If a court believes the infringement violation was a close 
call, the closeness would tend to show that the actions of the 
                                                          
 166. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (“We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of 
this standard.”). 
 169. Id. at 1371 n.5. 
 170. I.e., What types of evidence will tend to indicate willfulness? 
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defendant infringer were not objectively reckless.  Indeed, the 
Seagate court hinted that this would be an important factor in 
determining willful infringement.171  The Seagate court stated 
that to avoid a preliminary injunction a defendant must show 
“a substantial question as to invalidity,” and thus if the court 
denies a preliminary injunction, the defendant’s actions would 
not likely be objectively reckless.172 
The use of this factor also comports with copyright law’s 
use of a similar factor, “a substantial defense to infringement,” 
in determining objective recklessness.173 Other areas of the law 
are in accord; for example, the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of objective recklessness in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. 
Burr.174  In Safeco, the Court discussed the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act’s (FCRA) requirement that if any adverse action 
is taken against a consumer on the basis of his credit report, 
the consumer must be notified of the action.175  Any willful 
violation results in civil liability.176  The Court in Safeco 
concluded that a “reckless” disregard of the notice requirement 
met the “willful” standard.177  As part of its analysis, the Court 
found that one of the defendants, Safeco, violated the notice 
provision but not willfully.  It concluded that Safeco’s reading of 
the statute was a reasonable one and thus not objectively 
reckless.178  Note that this factor is entirely objective and does 
not include any elements of what the defendant actually 
believed.  Thus if the defendant actually believed that he had a 
good defense, but its defense was objectively unreasonable, 
then this factor has not been met. 
Additionally, we might expect more sophisticated parties 
such as a large corporation or an inventor with particular 
                                                          
 171. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d at 1374 (Plaintiffs unable to 
meet probability of success factor in preliminary injunction standard unlikely 
to win willfulness argument). If the case is a close one, probability of success 
should be lower and thus it should be less likely that willfulness will be 
shown. 
 172. Id. (“Similarly, if a patentee attempts to secure injunctive relief but 
fails, it is likely the infringement did not rise to the level of recklessness.”). 
 173. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
 174. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208–10 (2007). 
 175. See id. passim; 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2006). 
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006). 
 177. Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 178. Id. at 2216 n.20 (“Where, as here, the statutory text and relevant 
court and agency guidance allow for more than one reasonable interpretation, 
it would defy history and current thinking to treat a defendant who merely 
adopts one such interpretation as a knowing or reckless violator.”). 
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knowledge of the patent system to be more diligent in avoiding 
infringement.  This factor would support the second part of the 
court’s new test: whether the infringing party knew or should 
have known of the objectively high risk that it was 
infringing.179  Thus, a small start-up company perhaps cannot 
reasonably be required to spend up to $100,000 for an 
infringement opinion.  However, larger companies with more 
resources and internal patent law departments perhaps might 
be reasonably expected to expend larger amounts on avoidance 
of infringement.  Several copyright cases also support this 
principle.180 
Another broader set of factors that might be applicable to a 
patent infringement action could be loosely categorized as 
“remedial factors.”  These factors would establish that the 
defendant attempted to remedy the infringement once it 
learned of the plaintiff’s patents.  One important consideration 
from a policy perspective in this category would be a serious 
attempt at designing around a patent.  Some copyright cases 
hold that a serious attempt at differentiation of the accused 
product and the copyrighted work can support a finding that 
there exists no willful infringement.181  This factor clearly is 
supported by the overall goals of the patent system.182  A 
primary purpose of the patent system is to disseminate 
                                                          
 179. See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 180. Compare Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. 
Mont. 1990) (finding no willfulness when an unsophisticated restaurant owner 
went to the library and researched a home use exemption to copyright law but 
was ultimately wrong in his conclusion), with Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol 
Publ’g Group, 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that a copyright infringement in which the book’s author was 
an attorney and the publisher was familiar with copyright law supported 
willfulness finding). 
 181. Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800 (4th Cir. 
2001) (finding that an attempt to differentiate a product from a copyrighted 
product was evidence that the infringement was not willful). 
 182. “According to the Federal Circuit, the ability to design around an 
existing patent is a benefit of a patent system that ensures a ‘steady flow of 
innovations to the marketplace.’”  Joshua Stowell, Comment, Willful 
Infringement and the Evidentiary Value of Opinion Letters after Knorr-Bremse 
v. Dana, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15 (2005) available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0005.pdf (citing 
and quoting William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and 
Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful 
Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 419 (citing Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control 
USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). 
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knowledge of new inventions and to facilitate the invention of 
derivative works, as well as to spur the marketplace to find a 
new and better way of accomplishing the same task.  This 
includes finding ways around the patent’s limits and 
protections.  Patent law should encourage inventors to make a 
good faith effort to design around a patent because it promotes 
more inventive behavior by allowing competition.  What 
constitutes a sufficient design around, however, is uncertain 
prior to a court ruling.183  Thus, any good faith effort at design 
around should be allowed as a defense to willful infringement.  
There might be other, unlisted considerations that would fall 
under this broad “remedial” category as well.  For example, 
where the defendant halted all infringing activities upon 
learning of the patent.  Indeed many of these factors find 
support in pre-Seagate decisions.184 
When faced with accusations of infringement, a potential 
defendant must make a choice as to whether to continue the 
infringing activity, stop the infringement activity, modify its 
conduct so as not to infringe, or take other actions to deal with 
the situation.  Seagate and the factors identified above that 
would be relevant to the determination of willfulness suggest 
that courts should simply look at how this process of decision 
making was carried out in order to determine willfulness 
instead of focusing so much on the patent opinion.  Courts 
could look to corporate law and adopt a simpler framework that 
requires two factors: sufficient gathering of information given 
the circumstances and sufficient evidence of adequate 
deliberation.  A valid patent opinion would become simply one 
means for satisfying the information requirement.  These 
requirements would be flexible based on the circumstances 
such as the size and financial condition of the company, the 
time in which the decision must be made, and other factors that 
would normally be expected to affect an informed decision. 
This approach is likely to comport with the court’s 
endorsement of factors of commercial fairness that it suggested 
would be relevant.185  This test would use the recklessness 
                                                          
 183. See infra note 191 for discussion of a case in which infringement of the 
patent hinged upon the meaning of one word. 
 184. See Stowell, supra note 182 (collecting cases that refused to find 
willfulness upon a showing that the defendant, in good faith, attempted to 
design around the patent or abandoned the infringing activity upon getting 
notice of the existence of the patent). 
 185. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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standard.  Consideration of the two factors provided above 
would reflect a true understanding of the nature of the 
business and patent world as many of the litigants are 
companies and entrepreneurs who are not skilled patent 
attorneys.  They are making decisions in real time, often with 
inadequate information, that have potentially grave 
consequences for their companies.186  The approach reflects the 
fiduciary duty of care that directors are held to with regard to 
corporate transactions.  Directors can be held personally liable 
for decisions that lack any rational basis187 or are otherwise 
unreasonable.188  These directors are further insulated by the 
business judgment rule, which presumes that corporate 
activities are proper.189  Indeed, this corporate doctrine 
comports with the partnership statutes in many states that 
hold partners liable only for gross negligence.190 
The idea behind both the business judgment rule and the 
process framework is that courts need to recognize that being 
successful in business and the progress of technology entails 
taking risks often based on inadequate information.191  
                                                          
 186. See supra note 8. 
 187. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (holding that a 
business decision that lacks a rational basis can give rise to personal liability 
on the part of the directors). 
 188. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that a 
failure of adequate process can result in personal liability of a director); see 
also MINN. STAT. §302A.251(1) (2008). 
 189. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. 
 190. See e.g., MINN. STAT. §323A.0404(c) (2008) (“A partner’s duty of care to 
the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding up of the 
partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly 
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation 
of the law.”). 
 191. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); 
see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 general cmt. (West 2007) (“Retention of 
[the business judgment rule] is essential as an incentive to directors to take 
corporate risks that may lead to corporate profits . . . .”).  In the patent world, 
a business simply cannot predict how a court is likely to rule regarding the 
scope of their claims or their competitor’s claims until litigation.  Despite this 
high uncertainty, decisions in this field can have tremendous consequences for 
companies.  This would not be unusual for litigation in general; however for 
patents the issue is more profound as patent cases turn on the interpretation 
often of one word.  For example, “the interpretation of the word ‘reference’ in 
the phrase ‘reference means’ was a $51 million issue in a recent case.”  
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 12, at 804 (citing Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. 
BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. 
Colo. 2006), aff’d 222 F. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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Allowing firms some room for error increases the likelihood 
that firms will want to explore new technological areas and 
take innovative risks. 
While not an exhaustive list of the factors likely relevant in 
a court’s willfulness determination, these factors would likely 
be important to any such determination.  To summarize, based 
on current copyright law and other sources of law, courts likely 
will consider the following factors (among other possible 
factors) in making a finding of willfulness based on objectively 
reckless behavior: 1) the closeness of the case and the 
defendant’s good faith belief of non-infringement; 2) the 
defendant’s level of sophistication, including size and financial 
condition; 3) the defendant’s serious attempts at designing 
around a patent or mitigating infringing conduct; and courts 
might consider 4) the defendant’s internal processes when 
confronted with infringement claims.  One interesting point to 
note is that all of these factors are somewhat interrelated.  For 
example, closeness of the case, reasonable defense, and process 
factors might be applied slightly differently depending on the 
sophistication of the parties and so forth. 
2. Effect of Seagate 
One of the biggest complaints with the “due care” standard 
was that the Federal Circuit often over scrutinized the opinions 
of counsel.192  If the opinion was not technically correct in the 
slightest of details, the Federal Circuit figured that it was 
unreasonable to rely on that opinion and would find willfulness 
despite a contrary interpretation by the opinion counsel.193  The 
Federal Circuit essentially treated business leaders as patent 
experts as a result of its dissection of counsel’s opinions being 
very thorough.  This, coupled with the charge of opinion 
shopping if companies obtained multiple opinions, put business 
leaders in a precarious situation.  They essentially had one shot 
to find a very good patent attorney.  This focus on the opinion 
also led courts to approve attorney-client privilege waivers for 
opinions relied upon.  Often courts extended these waivers to 
trial counsel as well. 
With the advent of the new “objective recklessness” 
standard, the Federal Circuit and courts likely will back away 
from their opinion nitpicking, for the new standard is not only 
                                                          
 192. See, e.g., Y’Barbo, supra note 62, at 67. 
 193. Id. 
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an objective standard but a more stringent “reckless” standard 
instead of simple negligence.  An opinion rendered by a trained 
patent professional that clears the defendant of infringing 
would likely allow a potential infringer to escape triple 
damages.  However, there might be some cases in which the 
patent opinion is so egregious and the company sophisticated 
enough in patent law such that the company should have 
known not to rely on that particular patent opinion.  This 
would all be analyzed under the factors regarding the business 
decision making process as well as the sophistication of the 
parties. 
Furthermore, as this standard is more difficult for 
plaintiffs to meet, it would be expected that the amount of 
summary judgment rulings early in the patent litigation 
process would increase to dispose of the willful infringement 
counts.194 
Finally with the ruling on attorney-client privilege waiver 
not extending to trial counsel, the whole thrust of Seagate’s 
motivation to seek the mandamus in the first place, this 
Comment would expect that companies would continue to seek 
independent trial and opinion counsel to make sure they can 
maintain trial counsel attorney-client privilege.195 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Seagate overturned a previous decision in 
Underwater Devices that had established an affirmative duty of 
care for potential infringers to avoid a finding of willfulness 
and triple damages.196  The court used interpretations of what 
the word “willful” means in copyright and other statutes to 
conclude that to establish a willful violation of the statute 
requires a showing of objective recklessness.197  This means 
that “to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 
                                                          
 194. See Boyd, supra note 9. 
 195. See WILLIAM M. ATKINSON, ALSTON & BIRD, L.L.P., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ADVISORY: WILLFULNESS REDEFINED: IN RE SEAGATE (Aug. 30, 
2007), http://www.alston.com (follow “Resources: Advisories” hyperlink; then 
follow article title hyperlink). 
 196. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 197. See id. 
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constituted infringement . . . .”198 
In doing so, the court did not address what factors, if any, 
would be important to courts in determining whether a 
defendant had acted in an objectively reckless manner.199  
Despite this, there are two good sources for finding guideposts 
for future decisions.  First, look at which factors were used in 
the past that are still consistent with the new objective 
recklessness standard.  Second, look at some of the factors of 
willfulness that copyright and other analogous areas of law 
have developed. 
Applying this process, this Comment has shown several 
factors likely to be important.  They include: 1) closeness of the 
case, 2) defendant’s size and financial condition, 3) failures of 
the potential infringer to follow objectively reasonable 
processes in evaluating claims of patentees, and 4) remedial 
efforts upon learning of the patent at issue, such as a product 
redesign.  While these factors are not the only factors a court is 
likely to consider, they are a start at attempting to articulate a 
court’s methodology.  The benefit of having these as a starting 
point is to allow companies and other interested parties to have 
some idea of how to structure their conduct.  These factors and 
the court’s hint at commercial standards could suggest a 
framework shift that focuses on adequacy in the defendant’s 
decision making process and not the final decision itself. 
Finally, Seagate is likely to help companies faced with 
patent litigation suits maintain their attorney client privilege 
with their trial counsel.200  To take advantage of this ruling, 
companies will likely rely even more heavily on separate 
opinion and trial counsel.  Also, while an opinion will still be 
very important, as it is the best way for a defendant to show 
lack of objective recklessness, the opinion a defendant obtains 
will be less likely to be picked apart by the court in the 
willfulness phase and more likely to be a bullet-proof shield 
that the company may use to defend against a willfulness 
finding. 
 
                                                          
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1373. 
